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but would not recall its proper use; con-
sequently, no information can be sent to 
neurobiomechanics. This would be a more 
“central” deficit than the authors’ example, 
characterized by a worse performance.
The role of affordances
In  our  opinion  the  model  would  be 
improved if affordance for action mecha-
nisms  were  integrated:  The  potentiation 
of motor interactions consistent with the 
conventional use of a perceived tool (Bub 
et al., 2008).
Affordances  would  easily  explain  the 
mechanism underlying the quick choice of 
the most appropriate tool when an action 
goal is given. In Figure 1A, bidirectional 
connections  between  available  tools  and 
usage  contexts  represent  the  automatic 
activation  of  stable  affordances  (Borghi 
and Riggio, 2009) emerging from invari-
ant features of the tool (mainly its func-
tional  meaning)  incorporated  into  the 
object representation in long term memory 
(e.g., a spoon typically stirs and scoops, a 
knife cuts and spreads). Activation of sta-
ble affordances is independent of context 
or task to be carried out. Furthermore, for 
each stable affordance, variable affordances 
emerging from temporary characteristics of 
the tools such as their current handle ori-
entation are also activated.
When an action goal is given (stir the 
coffee), attention is restricted to a specific 
action  context  (to  stir)  and  oriented  to 
available and action-consistent tools (spoon 
and stirrer). Thus, activation of a restricted 
number of stable and variable affordances is 
privileged (e.g., “spoon + to stir” and “stir-
rer + to stir” with the right hand) over those 
not consistent with the action goal. Here, the 
controller will select “spoon + to stir” instead 
of “stirrer + to stir” and execute the required 
action with the hand corresponding to the 
handle orientation. Selection between two 
equally appropriate tools is assumed to be 
determined by stronger stable and variable 
affordances being activated.
A commentary on
The  neuroscience  of  storing  and  mold-
ing tool action concepts: how “plastic” is 
grounded cognition?
by Mizelle, J. C., and Wheaton, L. A. (2010). 
Front.  Psychology  1:195.  doi:  10.3389/
fpsyg.2010.00195
PlasTic or adaPTive? a noTe on 
Terminology
In our opinion, the use of the term “plastic-
ity” is problematic because it is too generic to 
properly account for the processes supposed 
to be involved. Plastic changes in neuronal 
circuits can reflect either modifications of 
existing circuits or the generation of new 
circuits. Thus, when a new action is added 
to the sensory–motor repertoire of a given 
tool, it is not possible to demonstrate whether 
the previous neuronal substrate changed its 
structure or a new circuit was recruited and 
connected to the original one. Defining the 
exact nature of this plasticity is an issue to be 
addressed in future research. From a behav-
ioral point of view, we would refer to the 
capability of a concept to attract new motor 
meanings as “adaptive grounded cognition,” 
thus the higher the number of new actions 
embedded in one tool concept, the larger is 
the number of tasks it can be recruited for.
commenTs on ideomoTor aPraxia
We believe that both the “pantomime of tool 
use” and the “selection of the tool appropri-
ate for a task” should be tested on the same 
patient to allow the model to discriminate 
between ideomotor and conceptual apraxia.
According to the authors, a patient with 
ideomotor apraxia can correctly select both 
the tool and the usage context which are 
appropriate for a task, but is unable to trans-
late this knowledge into a correct complex 
movement. Based on their model, the above 
described deficit can be explained through 
impairment  of  the  usage  context  mod-
ule alone. Patients would correctly select 
the tool because they identify it visually 
Unlike the original model, our control-
ler collects sensory–motor feedback from 
the executed action and sends it to both the 
potential neurobiomechanics and available 
tools/usage contexts stages. The first con-
nection allows for on-line corrections of 
the pre-programmed movement while the 
second allows for action re-programming 
should a new tool need to be employed 
(Figure 1A).
If  no  canonical  tool  is  available,  no 
  stable–variable affordances consistent with 
“stirring and scooping” and the temporary 
characteristics of the tool will be activated. 
However, the presence of an action goal 
to be accomplished activates the “to stir” 
usage context (bold framed action) which 
then calls the controller to scan all available 
objects and select an alternative with which 
the required action can be executed.
We also propose more detailed selection 
criteria. The selection of an object would 
depend on the amount of structural, seman-
tic, and temporary features it shares with the 
unavailable canonical tool as a function of 
the action goal to be accomplished. Thus, 
to  replace  the  canonical  spoon  or  stirrer 
the object must, for instance, have a similar 
structure (elongated and thin), it must be 
“something that can come into contact with 
food” and its state must be compatible with 
the action itself (it cannot be dirty or cur-
rently employed in an action incompatible 
with the required action goal, e.g., spreading 
mayonnaise). If an object sufficiently matches 
the features of the unavailable canonical tool, 
it is selected as a new tool to accomplish the 
required action via backward connections of 
the controller with the available tools/usage 
contexts stages. From the available objects 
(hammer, knife), the knife is finally selected 
and a motor program similar to that used 
for the spoon is implemented (Figure 1B).
In our proposal, the controller stage is 
therefore crucial in the motor implemen-
tation of actions automatically afforded by 
object perception, and of those voluntarily 
programmed on new tools. In the first case, 
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the absence of canonical tools, a new stable 
affordance will be gained by the originally 
non-canonical tool. Nevertheless, this new 
stable functional meaning will remain sec-
ondary to the proper canonical use of the 
tool as well as context dependent.
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similar to the original model, the control-
ler integrates the product of the activation 
of available tools, usage contexts, and neu-
robiomechanic stages (stable and variable 
affordances) into a defined motor program. 
In the second case, by receiving information 
from the action goal/usage context stages, 
it also governs the selection of a new tool 
(from the available ones).
The  new  action–object  association 
is assumed to be very weak and context 
dependent and to disappear if a canonical 
object becomes available again. However, if 
Figure 1 | (A) Selection of the most appropriate tool as a function of the action goal and the automatically activated stable and variable affordances. (B) Selection of 
an alternative tool which sufficiently matches the features of the unavailable canonical one.
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